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Security management is important for the effective functioning of a grid system. Here we 
present a security management model developed for the lightweight multilevel grid system. We decided 
to implement a role based security model, where a number of roles are defined for the grid. Different 
roles have different access restrictions. They are assigned to users and this is how users receive rights in 
the grid. Every cluster in the grid has security service, which handle user's identification and access 
control. The role based access control allows us to incorporate some simple access decision logic in the 
information service, which makes controlling user rights easier. Further in this paper we compare our 
security architecture with that of the lightweight middleware H2O and MOCCA in order to identify the 
important requirements, common concepts and technical solutions which may be reused.  
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Security is a central issue in computational grids. These are usually composed of resources in 
multiple administrative domains, and are accessed by large numbers of users. In order to maintain 
a certain degree of security it is important that not every user has the same level of access to the 
available resources.  
The purpose of this report is the construction of a lightweight grid in the light of security 
and user management requirements. We set as a main priority the simplicity of the architecture 
and implementation. In our architecture, the grid system consists of inter-connected clusters of 
computers/nodes. The cluster is the unit for node organization in the system. It is logical rather 
than physical unit – it is not necessary that nodes in the same cluster reside on the same physical 
location.  
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We define the following as the most important security requirements for grid: user 
management (including user registration and user authentication), authorization for access to 
resources, data encryption and security of executing code, delegation of rights and, finally, 
auditing of user access and resources usage. Security management model however is a relevant 
issue for many other system services, e.g. services that are responsible for discovery and 
allocation of resources. We have considered different solutions for the above-mentioned issues. 
There are presently different approaches to grid security and we will present the most important 
ones in the paragraphs that follow. 
In the Globus Toolkit [6] most security issues are handled by the Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) [3, 5]. In GSI three entities exist: users, resources and programs. Every entity 
has a certificate that represents its global identity. The certificate is in standard X.509 format and 
contains the global name of the entity as well as additional information (e.g. the public key). 
Verification of identity is done using SSLv3 protocol which also verifies the identity of the 
Certification Authority that issued the certificate. In GSI delegation of rights is supported – one 
entity may delegate its rights (or part of them) to other entities using a short-term proxy. The 
proxy certificate is signed by a user or another proxy as opposed to the user certificate which can 
only be signed by the Certificate Authority. In this way a chain of delegation is created that 
reaches the Certification Authority. Every resource may specify its access policy (with Access 
Control List or in some other way). The authentication protocol verifies the user's global identity, 
but the global name should be mapped to a local user name, which resides on a local system, in 
order to be used by the local security subsystem. In order to achieve this, the GSI uses a map file 
in which the mapping between global and local names is recorded.  
An extension to the GSI is the Community Authorization Service (CAS) [16]. CAS 
makes it possible for a security policy to be enforced on the basis of a global identity, so that 
mapping to local user accounts is not necessary. The CAS server stores information about who 
has permission, what permission is granted and which resource is the permission granted on. The 
resource owners give access to a community (e.g. a Virtual Organization) as a whole, and the 
community defines the finer rights. When a community member wants access to a resource, he / 
she sends a request to the CAS server. The server checks if the community policy permits such 
access. If it does, the server issues a capability that allows the user to perform actions. The user 
presents this capability to the resource server. The latter checks if both the local policy and the 
capability permit the requested access, and if so the resource server grants the requested access to 
the user. The CAS server is managed by an administrator who adds users, creates groups, and 
assigns rights and roles. The credentials that the CAS server delegates to the users have the form 
of restricted proxies. In this approach the CAS server is susceptible to possible security-caused 
problems – for example, a denial of service attack against it may cut off the users from the 
resources.  
Another solution for authorization, to some extent similar to the CAS server, is the 
Virtual Organization Management Service (VOMS) [4], implemented in the DataGrid project. 
Every Virtual Organization has a VOMS server, which stores all user   information – accounts, 
rights, groups, and roles. When a user authenticates, he/she contacts the VOMS, presenting 
his/her certificate and VOMS creates a proxy certificate, which includes a list of the user's groups, 
roles and rights, as well as the user's credentials. This proxy certificate is signed by the VOMS 
server and presented by the user when requesting access to a resource. The permissions, granted 
by a VO, can be locally overridden. 
JGrid [10] is a Java and Jini based computing grid infrastructure, developed by the 
Veszprem University, Hungary. For user management it uses two services [11, 14]. The 
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Authentication Service is responsible for user authentication and single sign-on. It issues short-
term credentials (private key and X.509 certificate) to those users, who have no long-term 
certificate. The Registration Service stores all user information and offers role based access 
control (in which each role represents a permitted actions list), user registration and user 
management (for the administrators). When the user wants to use a service, he contacts the 
authentication service, which issues the user a certificate containing the user's registration 
information. This certificate is used for user authentication hereafter. Then the user contacts the 
service via a SSL session (the short-term certificate is sent to the service). It receives the user 
information, containing his roles, from the registration service and decides whether to grant access 
to the user.  
GridLab [7] is a project of the Poznan Supercomputing and Networking Center. 
GridLab uses a Grid Authorization Service (GAS) [8, 2] for controlling user access. It represents a 
single logical point for defining security policy. The GAS subsystem comprises an AS Server, 
database, management module, and has modules for communication with 
services/applications/users and integration with other security solutions. It has initial support for 
the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) security model. The GAS is responsible for a single 
Virtual Organization (VO). The rights are given to users and groups and are for specific objects. 
When the user wants access to a resource, he or she requests authorization from the AS Server of 
the VO. The access policy is kept in a database, and the information is in the form of triples 
subject (user), object (resource) and their attributes, which describe the specific rights. Using the 
database, the AS decides whether to give or deny access.  
PROGRESS [18] is another project carried out by the Poznan Supercomputing and 
Networking Center in collaboration with other institutions. This Grid system [12] has a portal, 
where authentication and access control take place. The authentication is done with username and 
password. For user identification an Identity Server is used, which authenticates the user and 
manages sessions. For authorization the Resource Access Decision [19] model developed by the 
OMG is used. The authorization is performed by Resource Access Decision (RAD) Module. The 
resources and services are classified in a number of types and roles representing specific rights for 
every type are created. The access rights are associated with the roles. When a user is 
authenticated, he is issued a token (which usually is the user's session cookie). At resource access 
time the user's token is sent to the portal, which includes it in the call to the Grid Service Provider 
(the subsystem that is responsible for resource management). The Identity Server verifies the 
token, and after that the user name is extracted from it. A request to the RAD module is made, 
containing the user name, the requested access rights and the resource. The RAD module decides 
whether the user has rights, and if so – the operation is carried out and the result is returned to the 
portal.  
H2O [9, 13] is a component-based and service-oriented framework, intended to provide 
lightweight and distributed resource sharing. It is developed at the Department of Math and 
Computer Science at Emory University. This architecture is based upon the idea of representing 
resources as software components, which offer services through remote interfaces. Resource 
providers supply a runtime environment in the form of component containers (kernels). These 
containers are executed by the owners of resources and service components (pluglets) may be 
deployed in them not only by the owners of the containers, but also by third parties, provided that 
they possess the proper authorization. The clients access the services through their interfaces. For 
interaction of components different protocols may be used. The security mechanisms in the 
framework are located at the containers. Both containers and services are accessed through 
security proxies. The execution of the pluglet’s code is under the control of the container. Code, 
invoked by the container, is executed in the security context of the pluglet deployer, while the 
CoreGRID TR-0023  Page 4 of 12
  
 
remote calls are executed in the security context of the user, who obtained a particular reference. 
Authentication is performed through JAAS. X.509 certificates may be used but are not 
mandatory. The protection of resources owned by the container providers is performed by the 
Java security model and JAAS. Two types of policies are established – global and pluglet-related. 
The global one, specified by the container provider, defines what actions the code of a pluglet 
may perform. The provider grants permission on the bases of the source, where the code comes 
from, the party that has signed it, the party that invokes it, and the time when the code is allowed 
to be executed. This is achieved by substituting the default JRE policy provider with a custom one 
in the framework. The pluglet policy is specified by the service deployer and controls access to 
particular interfaces. The deployer may specify exactly which remote interfaces may be used by a 
particular client. 
After considering different solutions, we decided to implement in our grid a role based 
security model, as in [4, 14, 8]. A Role Based Security Model (RBAC) is also used in the 
PERMIS System for user authorization [17].  In this model, a number of roles are defined in the 
grid and rights are associated with roles, not with particular users. This approach has the 
advantage that there is no need to assign rights to every user separately – the user is assigned one 
or more roles and he / she automatically receives the rights with them. We consider this to be a 
scalable solution. Moreover, the node manager of every cluster node may impose further 
restrictions upon the access to the resources, which it controls. In this way an additional flexibility 
of defining access policy is gained. For security at the level of code execution, sandboxing will be 
used, similar to the approach taken in the AliCE grid system [1, 20]. Thus, data and code security 
are guaranteed by the implementation technology that will be used, namely Java, as is in the case 
of H2O project [13]. A detailed comparison between our grid system and H2O is presented in the 
paper. 
In the rest of the paper we will discuss the following: Section 2 delves upon the user 
profile management, in Section 3 the user authentication mechanism is presented; Section 4 
makes overview of the authorization; Section 5 examines some issues connected with auditing, 
data and code security, Section 6 gives examples of grid access; Section 7 elaborates on the 
comparison of our security model and that of H2O and addresses possible collaboration with 
H2O/MOCCA [13, 15] in the future; and Section 8 makes a conclusion. 
2. User accounts 
Before discussing the user profile management in our security model, we will make a short 
overview of the grid architecture. We assume the grid consists of interconnected clusters of 
computers. The architecture is hierarchical and has three levels. The first level is the local level 
where all the clusters that comprise the system reside. The second level is made by connecting the 
clusters and represents the grid. The last level is the intergrid level. At this level a connection with 
other grids is made possible. Both the grid level and the cluster level have portals – the grid portal 
acts as the grid entry point and the portal of every cluster is its entry point. These portals present 
the user with a front-end for logging into the grid or a particular cluster. The cluster is the unit 
used for organizing resources and users in the grid. It is logical rather than physical – it is not 
necessary that the nodes, which belong to one and the same cluster, be physically close to each 
other. The system services are local for every cluster, and also there are respective system services 
for the grid level. 
Every user in the grid will have a personal user account. The account will be unique in the 
whole grid and every person will have one account – not different local accounts and one global, 
as is the solution used in other grid systems such as Globus for instance [2]. This user account 
belongs either to one of the clusters that comprise our grid, or to the grid level, if it is for an 
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external user. In order to use resources in the grid, the user should have an account. So when 
he/she contacts the grid portal for the first time, the user will be prompted to register so that an 
account will be created for him/her. In this case, the account will be created at the grid level and 
the user information will be stored at the Grid Information Service. When the user registers at a 
cluster portal, the account that will be created for him/her will belong to the respective cluster and 
the user information will be stored be the Cluster Information Service. At registration – regardless 
if the user registers at the grid or cluster portal - the user will provide various personal information 
and on the basis of this information the grid or cluster administrator will decide what rights to 
give to the user account. At first, when the account is created, it will be assigned the most 
restricted rights, and after that the administrator will change them according to the user's needs 
and personal information. Some users may have rights only to access resources that are local to 
the cluster, where their account belongs, while others may have rights to access resources in other 
grid clusters too. Thus we may distinguish five types of grid users: 
1. System Grid Administrator - has administrative rights to the whole grid. 
2. System Cluster Administrator – has administrative rights only to the cluster which he/she 
administers. 
3. User with Cluster access – has access only to the local cluster to which his/her account 
belongs. 
4. User with Cluster and Grid access – has access to his local cluster and the global grid. 
5. External Grid users – users who are not members of any cluster. 
The information for the cluster users will be kept in a database at the cluster where the 
user’s account belongs. This database will be maintained by the Cluster Information Service. At 
the grid level the information about the external user accounts will be stored and maintained by 
the Grid Information Service. This service will also keep information about the rights of the users 
in clusters, different from their own. Groups will be used for better organization of user accounts. 
A role based security model will be implemented where roles describe the type of access. There is 
be a number of roles for the different resource types, and for every type of role there are 
“subtypes”, which represent different levels of restriction on the access to the respective type of 
resource, represented by the role. The grid administrator and cluster administrators will assign 
roles to users and groups.  
The roles defined in our grid system are listed in Table 1. 
 
Resource Type and 
Resource Usage Weak Normal Strong 
Compute WeakComputeUsage NormaLComputeUsage StrongComputeUsage 
Storage WeakStorageUsage NormaLStorageUsage StrongStorageUsage 
Data WeakDataUsage NormaLDataUsage StrongDataUsage 
Network WeakNetworkUsage NormaLNetworkUsage StrongNetworkUsage 
Software WeakSoftwareUsage NormaLSoftwareUsage StrongSoftwareUsage 
Services WeakServicesUsage NormaLServicesUsage StrongServicesUsage 
    
Table 1. Map of User Roles. 
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The users with cluster access have rights for the local resources in their cluster, which are 
defined by a set of roles, kept by the Cluster Information Service. The users with cluster and grid 
access have rights for resources in remote clusters too. The roles for these users, which define 
their rights for access of remote resources, are kept by the Grid Information Service. These roles 
are essentially the same as the local roles, the only difference being that they give access to 
remote resources. Thus, the rights of each user in the system are defined by the roles, he/she 
possesses. Diagram 1. illustrates the organization of users and roles. 
When a service is published, a part of its description in the Information Service database 
will be the list of roles, which have access to it, and also a list of roles, which the service needs for 
execution (in fact, these roles identify what resources the service will use). In this way the owner 
of a service may define the access level to his/her service. Moreover, the cluster administrator is 
able to change the list of roles, associated with a service. Thus the access policy is controlled 
locally and the access rights may vary for the users with same roles but of different clusters.   
 
Another feature will be the opportunity to restrict user access locally. For every node in 
the cluster there will be a node manager, which controls the functioning of the node. For example, 
it monitors the execution of jobs on the node, sends information about the current status of the 
node to the information service and so on. It will be possible to make further restrictions on the 
access to the node's resources by stating which roles may start processes on the node. The node 
manager will be responsible for enforcement of the restrictions. 
In addition to the individual accounts associated with a particular cluster, there will be a 
guest account, which will offer anonymous access to the grid. This account will not reside at a 
particular cluster and will give very restricted rights. 
The users will be able to view their personal information and eventually change it. This 
should be possible only with the knowledge of the administrator, because the user access rights 
may depend on this information. Thus a change in it may result in granting more rights, or 




















User E  
roles 
 
Diagram 1. Users and Roles. 
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revoking rights. The administrator has the right to add, remove and change user accounts, as he is 
the one who defines the local security policy for the cluster. 
 
3. Authentication 
Authentication is the process of proving one’s identity. There are many different methods for 
authentication. Very often digital certificates are used to authenticate a user, but the method used 
depends mostly on the security level needed in the grid. We plan to support different mechanisms 
for authentication – at the beginning we will maybe use a simple username-password 
authentication and extend the functionality in the future so that it supports digital certificates and 
other methods. Here it is possible, according to the type of authentication used, different 
restrictions on the rights to be imposed – if a strong authentication is used more rights may be 
given to the user.  
In order to use grid resources, the user has to authenticate first. For authentication the 
user contacts the grid portal or a cluster portal and requests authentication. In case the user 
contacts a cluster portal, the authentication is performed by the Cluster Security Service, which 
checks the username and password in the Cluster Information Service’s database. If the user 
contacts the grid portal and the user is not an external user, the portal send the request to the Grid 
Security Service, which in turn forwards it to the Cluster Security Service of the cluster where the 
user account belongs. For this purpose, there will be a small database at the portal for mapping 
users to clusters. In order such mapping to be possible, every user should have a unique identifier. 
Digital certificates contain distinguished name, which is globally unique. But at the beginning we 
will not use certificates, and even when we begin to support certificates for authentication, we 
may not restrict users to use only this method for authentication. The solution is at registration 
time a unique identifier for the grid to be issued to every user. User e-mails may be used as 
identifiers, because they are globally unique, and the users remember their own e-mails. If the 
user is an external user, he/she is authenticated by the Grid Security Service, which uses the Grid 
Information Service. 
After the user is authenticated, a token (which may be a short-lived proxy certificate or a 
session cookie) is issued to him/her, which includes the user’s identity information and his/her 
roles. This token will be used when requests for a service are made.  
The user will then see a personalized page, which lists the services, to which the user 
has access. Through this page the user may start a service or submit a job. The user will not see 
services to which he/she has no access. This filtering will be performed on the bases of the lists of 
roles in the description of every service in the Information Service database. Thus the user will 
see only those services with relevant roles. These lists with roles will be used with a similar 
purpose when a user submits a job. In this case, when the Resource Broker contacts the 
Information Service requesting a list of resources for executing the job, the Information Service 
will return only those resources which the user has right to use.  
All user information – identity information, roles, etc. - will be stored in a database. 
Actually, there will be such a database in every cluster, and one for the grid level. The latter will 
store information only about the external user accounts and about the roles of users in other 
clusters. The Grid Information Service will control the grid level database whereas the Cluster 
Information Services will control the databases in the clusters. In fact, the Information Services 
will store all the information in the grid – the user information, resource information, roles 
descriptions, etc. Thus, the Information Services will act as wrappers for the databases with the 
different information, but will also offer additional functionality, such as filtering services and 
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resources for example. The Security Services will use the Information Services to retrieve user 
information when authenticating users. The Resource Management Services will use them for 
locating resources. Any service that needs to store information will use the Information Services.   
4. Authorization 
Authorization is the process of determining if the user has the proper rights to perform an 
operation – e.g., use a service. Every request for a service will be made at the grid portal or some 
cluster portal. Before making any request, the user should be authenticated. Actually, a direct 
request for a resource by the user will not be possible. The user will be able to perform two kinds 
of actions – submit a job for execution, and use a service. The resources will be presented as 
services, so that the use of a resource will be actually a use of a service. In the first case – job 
submission – the resources will be reserved by the Resource Management Service (RMS), and not 
directly by the user. When making the reservation, the RMS will have the user’s token so that it 
will know the user's roles and identity.  When the RMS contacts the Information Service (IS) 
while searching for resources, it will send as a part of the request the user's roles, so that the IS 
will be able to filter the resources according to the roles. After that, when the RMS decides which 
resource(s) will use from the list, made by the IS, it will contact the node manager of the resource. 
The node manager will check if there are no local restrictions for the user's roles and also it may 
make a request to the Cluster or Grid Security Service to find whether the user really has the roles 
stated in the token. Thus, an additional security check is added to the process of granting access to 
a resource. It is meant for cases where a user's token is forged.   
Another important issue concerning authorization is the delegation of rights. When a 
process is started on behalf of the user – for example, a process to do some computation while 
performing a submitted job – the process should have the rights of the user in order to be able to 
use resources. That is why at creation time the process will be issued a token with the user’s roles. 
It is possible the process's token to include only those user roles, which are needed for its work.  
In our system there will be no special authorization service. With the chosen security 
model, authorization is implicitly realized by the Information Service, the resource and service 
providers when publishing resources and services, and eventually the node manager. Thus the 
authorization decision mechanism is incorporated in the functioning of the grid system.  
5. Logging and Code Security 
Logging is connected with grid security, but also with accounting and grid statistics. It is 
important that each user’s authentication (login) be logged. The information will be stored in the 
database with user information in Cluster Information Service (or Grid Information Service if the 
user is external for the grid). Also, every request for service use should be logged at the cluster 
where the resource resides and every successful grant should also be logged. This information 
gives statistics about users and resources – for every resource the administrator will know how 
much it is used, and for every user – how much time does he/she uses the grid services. These 
statistics may be used for optimizing the functioning of the grid. For example, if some type of 
resources is used very much, it will be evident that more resources from this type are needed in 
the grid. The statistics may also be used for security purposes where they may help detect an 
intrusion or a breach in the grid security. They are also very important for calculating how much 
users should pay for the resources they used.  Since we plan our grid as an economy grid, this 
application of statistics for accounting purposes is more important than in other grids, which do 
not have economy features. 
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Code and data security is another important aspect in grid security. For providing 
security for the stored data, we will store it in an encrypted format. Only those users, who have 
the permission to use the data, should be able to decrypt it. Moreover, the communication 
between the remote clusters, and even within the cluster (the nodes in the cluster may be 
physically remote) should use some secure protocol, such as SSL. For security of executed code 
and detection of malicious code, the Java technology security features will be used. The JVM 
offers language safety, type safety, byte code verification and protection domain mechanism. For 
enhancing security control, the JAAS framework may be used, which adds security features to the 
standard JVM features.  
6. Grid Access Use Cases  
In this section we present two use-cases which demonstrate how our system functions. 
First we consider the case of job submission (we may call this using a non-persistent service), and 
after that the case of using a service (persistent service – it is offered by the grid system). As can 
be seen, the work done by the system in both cases is similar.  
6.1. Job Submission 
Suppose a user wishes to submit a job to the cluster portal. Following are the steps that are usually 
performed in this case.  
1. First of all, he or she must log on the grid. This is done at the grid or cluster portal. 
After successful logon, the user has a token with his or her identity and other 
information, such as the user's roles. Now the user may submit the job.  
2. After the job is submitted, the portal contacts the Cluster RMS (CRMS), which is 
responsible for scheduling the job for execution on particular resources.  
3. The CRMS may send request to the Cluster Security Service (CSS) for confirmation 
that the user really has the roles listed in the token. If the roles are confirmed, the 
CRMS proceeds with the scheduling. This additional step may enhance security in 
case of a forged token. 
4. The CRMS uses the Cluster Information Service (CIS) in order to find the possible 
resources. The CIS will search its database for resources, which meet the requirements 
of the task. Since in the description of every resource the roles, which have access to 
it, will be listed, the CIS will be able to filter the resources and return to the Broker 
only those, to which the user has access.  
5. After the results reach the CRMS, it decides which of them to use for the job (if there 
are more than needed) and partitions the job among them in case the job may be 
parallelized.     
6. The CRMS contacts the chosen resources' Node Managers. They should confirm that 
the resources are free at the moment and may be used. The Node Managers also check 
whether there are any additional restrictions on the user's roles, which do not allow the 
execution of the task on the node. If there are no such local restrictions the job is 
started.  
In the above scenario, a user cannot request directly a resource – every request is issued 
by the CRMS. 
Diagram 2. illustrates the sequence of steps, performed by the system for a job 
submission. 
 
































The situation is similar if the user contacts the Grid Portal and not a Cluster Portal. In 
this case after the job is submitted, the request is forwarded to the GRMS (here, too, the GRMS 
may request confirmation of user roles from the GSS), which contacts the Grid IS (GIS) for 
resources for execution of the job. The GIS communicates with CIS of the clusters in order to find 
available resources. After resources are found, the task is forwarded to the proper CRMS.  
Both when a task is submitted to the Grid Portal and a Cluster Portal, it is possible if 
there are no available resources at the moment the task to be scheduled for a future moment. 
6.2 Using a service 
In addition to submitting jobs to the grid, the user will be able to use other resources and services. 
All resources will be presented as services, so using resources will be in fact using services. These 
services may be called persistent services – they are offered by the grid system and are not 
submitted by the users. Now suppose that the user wants to use a service. After the user is 
successfully authenticated, the user sees all services to which he or she has access. Now the user 
finds the service that he or she wishes to use. The cluster portal forwards the user request for the 
service to the CRMS and from now on the steps are the same as in the previous use-case. If the 






        CSS 
CRMS 




communications for the initial user authentication  
communications for submitting a job by the user, finding resources and 
returning the result  
 
communications for confirmation of user’s identity 
communications between the Node’s Manager and the CRMS (giving the task 
and return of the result) 
Diagram 2. Job Submission in Steps. 
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7. Comparison to H2O Middleware and Future Work 
When comparing the proposed architecture and security model of the our grid platform with those 
found in H2O, we can find several differences but also many commonalities. The main feature 
distinguishing H2O from other grid middleware is the separation of roles of resource owners 
(providers) and service deployers. This means that the provider may offer only a raw 
computational resource to share, and the role of service deployment is left to authorized parties 
(deployers) who are allowed to deploy pluglets into H2O kernels. This is distinct from the 
standard scenario proposed by OGSA, where services (even if transient) are offered and deployed 
by resource providers. Such standard scenario may cause a barrier discouraging providers from 
sharing, especially when the process of installation (deployment) of services is sophisticated and 
time consuming. The H2O sharing model takes much of the burden from resource providers to the 
deployers, therefore encouraging providers to share, e.g. in P2P metacomputing scenario. We 
would consider it valuable if our architecture could also support such a model of resource sharing 
with dynamic service provision (deployment), as it is in H2O. 
The important part of security mechanisms in H2O is involved in the definition and 
enforcement of security policies. Both resource providers and pluglet deployers may specify their 
Java security policies, granting detailed set of permissions to the code executed by clients. The 
policies are based on the JAAS framework and extended with time-based constraints, protecting 
providers from malicious or erroneous code run by clients as well as restricting access to system 
resources (filesystem, network, etc.). We believe that these mechanisms, which are implemented 
in the H2O kernel may be useful for the building the prototype implementation of the GrOSD 
platform.   We can observe, that the H2O does not implement the role-based security model in the 
form proposed here. The users and their roles in H2O are constrained to the H2O kernel 
boundary, because of the assumption of independence of kernel providers, who are not assumed 
to be aware of each other. However, as the H2O is based on the JAAS framework and Pluggable 
Authentication Modules (PAM), then it it should be possible to plug in the authentication method 
using Cluster Security Service. This possibility and also potential applicability of restricted X.509 
proxies as those known from Globus GSI should be subject to more detailed investigation. 
Another important observation is that since the focus of the CoreGrid project is on a 
component approach for programming grid systems, then adopting several features from the H2O 
to the our architecture will enable easier integration of the latter with the MOCCA component 
framework. This will lead to the possibility of running MOCCA component applications on our 
platform, taking advantage of the simplicity and scalability of the lightweight platform for 
resource sharing, as well as providing a simple and powerful component programming model.  
Alternatively, we may consider the possibility of using MOCCA itself as a base 
component technology for building prototypes. Such features as dynamic deployment of 
components on shared resources using H2O mechanisms, inter-component communication using 
RMIX and simple programming model should provide a sufficient base for a lightweight, simple 
and scalable grid platform, adding the modularity and flexibility to the prototype. The detailed 
elaboration of such possible design will be the subject of our future research agenda. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We introduced the security architecture for a lightweight hierarchical grid. Our main purpose in 
making the design was the simplicity and scalability. We chose a role based access control 
security model and made some changes to the existing realizations of the model. Namely, the 
roles are not associated with particular rights and the access is specified by every resource and 
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service listing the roles that may use it. The lower level security will be realized by the Java 
technologies that will be used for the project implementation. We believe that this security model 
best suits our goals. 
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